Delegating the Deal: Human Authority, Accountability, and Oversight in Agent-Mediated Commerce
Abstract
Autonomous software agents are increasingly executing commercial transactions on behalf of human principals — discovering suppliers, evaluating offers, and placing orders without human involvement at each decision point. This paper examines the human factors dimension of this transition: what changes when humans delegate purchasing authority to agents, how the cooperative structure of commerce changes when one or more parties to a transaction is a software system, and what oversight, accountability, and trust mechanisms are required for agent-mediated commerce to function within organizational contexts.
We analyze a three-party transaction scenario (human principal, procurement agent, manufacturer) to identify the moments of delegation, the accountability gaps that delegation creates, and the design requirements for capability surfaces — the architectural interface layer through which agents interact with merchants — that support rather than undermine human oversight. We argue that the technical architecture of agent-commerce systems encodes assumptions about human authority that deserve explicit examination, and that CSCW research has important contributions to make in designing systems where automation is a tool of human delegation rather than a replacement for human judgment.
